Voices of Ukraine

Dmitry Tymchuk, Head of the Center for Military and Political Research, Coordinator of the Information Resistance group
11.13.2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine

Operational data from Information Resistance:

Russian-terrorist forces continue to violate the agreement on a temporary ceasefire. Over the past day, ATO position forces suffered more than 40 attacks by Russian occupation forces and illegal armed groups.

In particular, enemy troop activity is most noted in the Luhansk, Donetsk and Debaltseve directions – 13, 12 and 11 fire strikes each, respectively.

An enemy sniper unit was transferred to the Donetsk airport district, armed with the latest innovations of the Russian military-industrial complex – Anti-materiel rifles [large-caliber sniper rifles]. Saturation by the artillery (mortars) of gangs operating in the Kirov and Kyiv districts of Donetsk continues. The appearance of up to 10 new mortar detachments has been recorded.

In the district of Chornukhyne, Russian-terrorist troops undertook two unsuccessful attempts to attack. These were mainly insurgents from A. Mozgovogo’s gangs in cooperation with the so-called “Cossacks” arrived from Alchevsk, and with the support of cannon artillery and mortars. The enemy also used armored vehicles. The insurgent attacks were repulsed by Ukrainian troops.

In order to defuse tensions among residents of Luhansk region, “LNR” [Luhansk People’s Republic] insurgents vigorously spread rumors that Putin “will force” Poroshenko to pay welfare payments, supply gas, water and electricity in the areas controlled by the terrorists.

Russian special services are offered to terrorists recruit crews for transferring of RF military equipment in advance, even on “DNR” and “LNR” [occupied] territory, at the expense of Russian-trained insurgents. And only then do they arrive to obtain equipment on the territory of the Russian Federation and transport it to the territory of Donbas on their own. In the border areas of Russia, there are at least 4 points for the “transfer of technology” recorded and at least two major routes (north and south) for the transfer of supply goods, ‘VVT’ [weapons and military equipment] and personnel for the needs of the Russian-terrorist troops in Donbas.

Commanders of the units and formations of the Russian army, who are stationed in Donbas, were ordered to abandon the use of Russian state symbols while on the move or marching. The same order was prescribed to reduce the movement of troops and military equipment on bustling transport links to a minimum, it was suggested to use the “alternative routes.”

The concentration of groups of Russian forces into Donbas has ended. Most of the local gangs are also practically well-staffed now with personnel, weapons and military equipment. Currently, only the completion and transfer of individual units remain. The transfer of ammunition, fuel and other resources from the Russian Federation, within the framework of increasing stocks of material and technical resources for the autumn-winter period, are also being carried out. Thus, we can conclude that the aggressor has in fact today created a tool for increasing the intensity of fighting and for solving local problems within the “ATO zone.”

Source: Dmitry Tymchuk FB

Dmitry Tymchuk, Head of the Center for Military and Political Research, Coordinator of the Information Resistance group
11.07.2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine

Over the past few days, we observed the completion of the formation of enemy strike tactical groups in Donbas (strike [groups] in particular–their composition, place of deployment and character of conducted activities do not suggest that the Russian-terrorist troops are preparing for a defense), at the moment they are practically ready for an offensive. At the same time, Russia is intensively moving its units to the state border with Ukraine. Because of this, the question arises whether we should anticipate, firstly, a large-scale offensive by the Russian-terrorist troops in Donbas, and secondly, an open Russian invasion?

Let’s start with the latter. The fact that the Russians are moving, among other things, operational-tactical missile systems to the border, suggests that Putin is considering the option of open aggression against Ukraine (quite obviously, under the guise of “protecting the local population of Donbas that expressed their will in the elections at the DNR and LNR”). However, this scenario is clearly not the primary plan, and its preparation is more like a “safety net,” as well as the way to put pressure on Kyiv and to prevent Kyiv’s active offensive operations against terrorists.

This conclusion can be made based on the fact that:

1) Moscow never officially recognized the “DNR” and “LNR” [Donetsk- and Luhansk People’s Republics] as quasi-state formations – Russia only expressed its “respect for the will of the people in the south-east of Ukraine” in the course of the pseudo-elections (however, this formulation completely allows Putin “to defend ‘this’ will” if necessary).

2) Units of the Russian army that arrive into Donbas change into the uniform of local insurgents, with gang insignia, servicemen’s documents are seized – [these facts] demonstrate Russia’s focus on the continuation of the existing format of covert invasion.

This means that we shouldn’t discount open Russian invasion; it can most likely happen as a result of an offensive by Russian-terrorist forces on Donbas, their defeat, and successful offensives by Ukrainian troops in response.

And now about the preparation of enemy troops for the offensive in Donbas.

First of all, let’s talk about their composition. We, the Information Resistance group, cannot agree with the statements made by representatives of Western agencies and some representatives of the Ukrainian government that it’s only “instructors” from Russia who work in Donbas, training insurgents. The information at our disposal which also gets confirmed practically every hour (by the way, including testimony by captured Russian soldiers), suggests that not only Russian mercenaries are active in Donbas, but also Russian army units–including staff subversive and reconnaissance groups of GRU Spetsnaz, airborne units, and units that are part of Ground Troops brigades of Russian Armed Forces (mostly from Southern and Central Military Districts). Therefore, we urge officials to use caution when making such statements. [We] don’t need to pretend that we are only fighting against local insurgents, and that Russia does not carry out a covert invasion, and that they [Russia] only “help” them [“separatists] out. This is [simply] untrue.

Secondly, let’s talk about the plans of [the Russian] offensive. It’s clear to everyone that since these strike [tactical] groups have been created, then they will soon be used “in accordance with their intended purpose.”

Moreover, the enemy doesn’t believe that the Ukrainian troops will launch an offensive in the nearest future, otherwise [Russia] would engage in at least a semblance of defensive measures. Special thanks to Europe, who insistently forces Kyiv to “fulfill the ceasefire conditions,” although the “ceasefire” is [in itself] constant shellings by insurgents and the Russians. The number of attacks since the beginning of the “truce” is close to 2,500 and as a result we have a permanent expansion of territories controlled by the terrorists, and more than 100 fatalities on our side. 

We are confident that only the show of strength on our part will disrupt the enemy’s offensive plans. And if Kyiv is not ready for offensive actions for political reasons (including because of the threat of open invasion by Russia and the reluctance to upset the pathologically peaceful EU), then at least [we] must significantly enhance our defenses and firmly respond to attacks and any attempts of offensive actions and forcing our troops out from their positions. [We must] also initiate preemptive strikes against concentrations of live enemy troops and equipment near the positions of our troops.

[We] must finally understand that the “peaceful agreements” are the cover that allow the Russian-terrorist forces to spread more across the [Donbas] region, using the passivity of the ATO forces. If someone wants to play “in the peace”–no problem, [they] can conduct negotiations on a daily basis. But in practice, this should not prevent Ukrainian troops from acting appropriately and symmetrically to enemy actions. Unless, of course, we’re not going to meet the occupiers with flowers and songs about “the great friendship of brotherly nations.”

Luhansk graffiti: “Luhansk is Ukraine and Putin is a khuylo.”

Source: Dmitry Tymchuk FB

Dmitry Tymchuk, Head of the Center for Military and Political Research, Coordinator of the Information Resistance group
11.12.2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine

Operational data from Information Resistance:

Over the past day, Russian-terrorist forces conducted over 50 shellings of ATO forces’ positions; also, two armed clashes between the Ukrainian units and illegal armed groups were observed.

The insurgents and Russian occupiers are active in the directions of Luhansk, Donetsk, and Debaltseve – 21, 14, and 12 attacks respectively.

In particular, the situation was most tense near the settlements of Krymske – 8, Stanytsia Luhanska – 5, Donetsk Airport – 4, Chornukhyne, Avdiivka, Zaitseve – 3, Novomikhaylovka, Shchastya, Nikishyne–2 fire strikes each.

On November 11, 2014, the Ukrainian rocket artillery launched a preemptive strike on the accumulation of arms and military equipment of Russian-terrorist troops near the settlement of Mykolaivka (in Dokuchajevsk district [of Donetsk region]). As a result of the strike, destroyed were one of the fire division units of the Russian troops’ consolidated reactive [force] division (whose permanent place of deployment is the Southern Military District), the field ammunition depot of the same division, as well as several vehicles and units of military equipment. Following the strike, Russian command accused local terrorists of allegedly relaying the information about the Russian units’ positions to Ukrainian troops.

A consolidated company tactical group [CTG] of the Northern Fleet of Russia arrived at the district of Novoazovsk (shortly before this, the CTG was observed near the settlement of Kamensk-Shahtinsky, Rostov region of Russia). It is expected that this group will be part of the frontline echelon of the Russian-terrorist troops’ strike group at the maritime sector. The group is formed by marine units of the Northern Fleet.

The enemy’s new strike tactical group is concentrated in the area of Pervomaisk [Luhansk region]. This group consists of several company tactical groups of Russian troops (mainly from mechanized infantry brigades of the Southern Military District, and at least one of them is a consolidated group from airborne troops) and the groups of “people’s militia” headed by A. Mozgovoy, which were joined by a large number of insurgents from former I[gor] Besler’s gang and the Makiivska “militia” detachment.

The so-called “Cossack units” led by N. Kozitsin have allocated a strike armored group. This armored group includes up to 20 tanks and up to 20 other armored vehicles. A consolidated artillery division (up to 10 units of cannon artillery and a battery of 8 MLRS units) provides support to this armored strike group.

A transfer of artillery near the settlement of Yasinovataya [Donetsk region] by the enemy has been observed. [Our sources have] identified two mortar batteries and a consolidated artillery group (up to 6 units of cannon artillery and 4 MLRS units). Artillery works on the positions of Ukrainian troops and civilian targets in the area of Avdiivka.

An artillery group of Russian-terrorist troops that were earlier observed during another convoy (“Kamaz” cargo trucks with howitzers in trailers) have split up; some proceeded to Makiivka, and some – to the Petrovsky district of Donetsk.

“DNR” [Donetsk People’s Republic] gang formations organized a centralized training of artillery spotters and gunners. Regular officers of the Russian army conduct the training. In addition, the “DNR” made a decision to “dramatically improve the mobility of units.” To accomplish this, they will “requisition private vehicles” and “distribute the transportation fund of state enterprises.”

Source: Dmitry Tymchuk FB