Semenchenko: It’s not possible to take back Donbas because the Commander in Chief is “against” it

Posted on December 15, 2014 by chervonaruta

By Glavkom
12.15.2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine

It is not possible to take back Donbas because the President – Commander in Chief Petro Poroshenko – is “against” it. The Commander of the Donbas Battalion, an MP and first Deputy Head of the Committee on National Security and Defense, Semen Semenchenko, stated this in an interview with Glavkom.

“Because the Commander in Chief is ‘against’ [it]. He [has] said: we have an ATO. Although, speaking in Australia, he said that this is a war. I still don’t understand which line he is following. I believe that we have a war. We will register legislative changes in this regard also,” – said Semenchenko.

According to him, to “take back” Donbas, international support is needed.

“We need to create truly professional units in the east. We need to tighten the defenses, to plug the holes made by corruption. The falling oil prices also play a role, when the people of Russia will raise their heads in fight against the Kremlin junta,” – said the MP.

The battalion commander believes that retaking Donbas is possible within one year: “this is for the whole process, starting from the creation of the army, to closing the corruption loopholes, and finishing with the actual combat operations.”

Source: Glavkom

Posted in "Voices" in English, English, English News, South&Eastern Ukraine, War in Donbas | Tagged , , , , | 1 Comment

Anna Wendland: Die Ängstlichen

Posted on December 15, 2014 by tftranslate

Was PEGIDA und der Putinismus in Deutschland, Russland und der Ostukraine gemeinsam haben – und warum beide bei uns in Deutschland fehlinterpretiert werden

von Dr. Anna Veronika Wendland

Heute Show mischt sich als Russia Today getarnt unter Pegida-Demonstranten

Heute Show mischt sich als Russia Today getarnt unter Pegida-Demonstranten

Das satirische Kunststückchen der „heute Show“-Truppe war nur vordergründig zum Lachen – eigentlich bleibt einem selbiges im Halse stecken, wenn man hört, dass die Dresdner Montagsmarschierer mit den „System“medien nicht mehr reden, wohl aber mit einem, wenn auch noch so schlecht geschauspielerten, „Russia Today“. Das Vertrauen der sich als schweigende Mehrheit inszenierenden Zusammenrottung der Abendlandsretter in die (vermeintlichen) Mikrofonhalter der russischen Propaganda legt offen, dass hier zusammenwächst, was zusammengehört.

Putins Botschaft an die „Völker“ Europas lautet ja schon seit langem, sie sollten gegen den verderbten, von den USA aufgezwungenen Kosmopolitismus zu ihrer „Identität“, „Souveränität“ und „Kultur“ zurückfinden; der „konservative“ Wertekanon aus Fremdenfeindlichkeit und vorgeblicher Bindung ans Christentum und sein Familienbild gehört genauso zu dieser Botschaft wie die den latenten Antisemitismus nur notdürftig übertünchenden Lippenbekenntnisse zu einem nicht näher definierten und auch gar nicht verstandenen „christlich-jüdischen“ Europa.

Denn der Kampf gegen eine angebliche Islamisierung – vor allem in Dresden – zeigt ja nur, dass man lediglich einen beliebigen Popanz braucht, um sein Unbehagen an immer denselben Dingen laut herauszuschweigen: daran, dass nicht alle so sind wie wir selbst; daran, dass die Welt sich ändert; daran, dass Globalisierung sich nicht in meinem individuellen Recht auf billige Fernreisen erschöpft, sondern auch das Recht der anderen umfasst, unbehelligt in unserem Land zu leben und zu arbeiten.

Dieses Unbehagen ist aber noch mehr: es ist unterfüttert mit einer soliden Basis aus Hass gegen alle und alles, was nicht der selbstgesetzten Norm entspricht. Die Deutschen haben nichts gelernt seit den 1990ern, als der Mob auf vietnamesische Vertragsarbeiter, vereinzelt unter uns lebende Nichtweiße oder türkische Familien losging. Nichts gelernt seit der deutschen Terrormiliz NSU. Man will ja auch gar nichts lernen oder irgendwohin vorwärtskommen, sondern der Blick geht nach rückwärts, zu den unerfüllten Sehnsüchten nach einem Kapitalismus mit menschlichem Antlitz etwa, den man sich im Deutschmark-Nationalismus erfüllt geglaubt hatte, und der vom Euro und von der atlantischen Welthegemonie der Investmentbanker hinweggefegt wurde. So hatte man sich das nicht vorgestellt, und deswegen sehnt man sich wieder nach dem guten, dem schaffenden statt dem raffenden Kapital.

Und natürlich auch nach dem guten Führer, der diese Werte hochhält und es den Amerikanern, denen man es nie verziehen hat, dass sie uns befreit und umerzogen und „westernisiert“ haben, einmal so richtig zeigt. Da gerät jede Erinnerung an den Typus der russischen Besatzung und Umerziehung gnädig in Vergessenheit – entsprach diese Umerziehung nach stalinistisch-russischnationalen Muster in Ostdeutschland doch offensichtlich viel mehr dem deutschen Substrat, als es die Nazipropaganda vom slavischen Untermenschen behauptete. So können wir bilanzieren: die russisch-deutsche Freundschaft in Ostdeutschland, die gab es offensichtlich doch. Was sich über Generationen in den Köpfen richtig erfolgreich festgesetzt hat – oder, genaugenommen, nie daraus verjagt wurde, das ist der Autoritarismus und der Ethnozentrismus.

Deswegen fließt das neudeutsche Unbehagen am “System” so widerspruchsfrei mit der Querfront der deutschen Putin-Sympathisanten zusammen. Während letztere ordentlich krakeelen von der Weltverschwörung, marschieren erstere schweigend. Das nimmt sich eindrucksvoll aus und sieht so aus, als ob jemand, von höchster Not bedrückt, still leide und zum letzten Mittel greife, um “endlich gehört” zu werden. Das beeindruckt sogar harte Hunde wie Günter Jauch : “Es ist Winter. Es ist kalt. Es ist Advent. Und trotzdem kommen da zehntausend Menschen zusammen.” Man schweigt auch, weil man fürchtet, von wortverdreherischen Journalisten der Systempresse in die Falle gelockt zu werden, aber an dem, was bei allerlei „Montagsdemonstrationen“ landauf, landab ertönt, können wir ermessen, was da aus immer wieder fruchtbarem Schoß kriecht.

Es ist die neue europäische Rechte, in Parteiform gegossen von der AfD und dem Front National, gesponsort und gehätschelt mit russischem Geld und russischer „Souveränitäts“propaganda, geeint durch das unstillbare Verlangen nach Sicherheit durch Ausscheidung alles Störenden, alles “nicht Unsrigen”. Nicht umsonst heißt eine solche Bewegung in Russland „Naši“, die Unsrigen, und der Rest, die nicht Unsrigen, wird je nach Land und politischer Opportunität zum Schreckbild aufgebaut. Ob Islamisierung und Homoehe, wie bei uns und in Frankreich, oder „Gayropa“ und angeblicher ukrainischer „Faschismus“ – das sind nur die Chiffren für das Andere, das nicht so ist wie ich.

Beschrieben wird das in der öffentlichen Analyse von unseren wohlmeinenden Demokraten dann als „Ängste“: wahlweise „berechtigte Ängste“ oder, wenn’s etwas kritischer sein darf, „irrationale Ängste“, und als Lösungsangebot gilt, immer auch mit einem verstohlenen Schielen auf die Wählerstimmen, der „Dialog“ mit den „Ängstlichen“.

Und auch hier treffen sich PEGIDA und Putinismus: in der Versteher-Reaktion der Demokraten. Die Pegidaversteher bieten Bürgerdialoge mit Leuten an, die gar keinen Dialog wollen. Sie suchen den Grund der „Ängste“ ernsthaft in der Tatsache, dass die Errichtung von Unterkünften für ein paar Tausend Flüchtlinge in einer hunderttausende Einwohner zählenden Großstadt nicht „richtig kommuniziert“ worden sei. Die Pegidaversteher wollen nicht verstehen, dass die PEGIDA nichts anzubieten hat im Dialog außer der Lösung, dass alle gut sind, die so sind oder werden wie wir; und dass verhasst bleibt, wer anders ist: „Integration“ nennen sie das.

Und genau so missinterpretieren unsere Putinversteher die Agenda der russischen Regierung. Auch sie vermeinen, den Grund für die “Ängste” Russlands zu kennen. Was der PEGIDA die Islamisierung, das ist dem Putin die Expansion von NATO und EU: „Ängste“, die man „verstehen“ kann. Dass die Bedrohungen samt und sonders selbsterfunden sind, ist da zweitrangig. Und genauso gibt es auch eine Moskauer Vision von Integration im postsowjetischen Raum, die mit ökonomischer und politischer Integration gleichberechtigter und souveräner Partner soviel zu tun hat wie ein Panzer mit einem Bobbycar. Gleichwohl wollen uns immer noch etliche selbsternannte Russlandspezialisten weismachen, die NATO fahre auf dem Panzer, und Putin auf dem Bobbycar.

Genauso wie in Dresden noch niemand eine Burka gesichtet hat, gibt es in Kiew keinen von den USA inszenierten Putsch; beides – der drohende kulturelle Overkill durch den Islamismus und die amerikanische Verschwörung gegen Russland in der Ukraine – wird durch obstinate Wiederholung nicht wahrer.

Die „Naši“ in Deutschland, Frankreich und Russland, die ihre Ängste zum Vorwand für Aggression – verbale oder direkte – machen, brauchen aber auch gar kein Faktenwissen über die Welt in ihrer Komplexität. Denn sie haben sich bereits ihre eigene Welt zusammengedacht, so wie sie ihnen gefällt. Unser Unglück ist nur – beim Denken und beim Schweigen bleibt es nicht. Bleibt es nie bei diesen Leuten. Die Schweigenden in Dresden geben die schweigende Mehrheit ab für jene, die vornedran marschieren und die laut sagen, was die Schweigenden sich noch nicht trauen zu sagen, was sie aber denken; sonst würden sie nicht einem gewaltaffinen gelernten Koch und einen verkrachten, durch einschlägige Äußerungen aktenkundig gewordenen Stadtrat und anderen bärtigen, bulligen Gestalten folgen.

Die vorbestraften Köche und die verkrachten Stadträte kennen wir auch aus dem ukrainischen Donbass. Diese in Russland verkrachten Existenzen setzen dort mit Billigung und Wissen der Moskauer Regierung, und mit russischen Waffen in der Hand, die neurussische Identitätspolitik in die Tat um. Dazu gehört nicht nur die weinerliche Rhetorik eines vorgeblich lokal geerdeten Widerstands, derzufolge man “nicht gehört” werde. Dazu gehört auch, dass maskierte, tarnfleckgewandete, bärtige selbsternannte Stadtkommandanten in Namen der abendländischen Familie jungen Frauen den Cafébesuch untersagen, weil diese besser zu Hause “den russischen Herd hüten” sollten. Erinnert uns das an was? Haben wir das nicht irgendwo schon einmal gehört? Richtig. Diese Leute könnten auch beim Islamischen Staat sein – das Konglomerat aus “konservativen Werten”, Hass und Gewaltbereitschaft ist immer das gleiche.

In Deutschland sind wir noch nicht so weit, dass der Pegida-Cocktail gegen Menschen gezündet hat, mit der selbstmitleidigen Begründung, „weil wir nicht gehört werden“. Aber wir werden dahin kommen. Die ersten Vorzeichen, brennende bezugsfertige Flüchtlingshäuser, haben wir bereits gesehen. Genauso wie der Expansionsdrang der neurussischen Ethnokratie und ihre Propaganda hierzulande nicht durch Russlandversteherei, sondern nur durch scharfe Sanktionen und strenges Monitoring gestoppt werden können, so wird auch gegen das Phänomen PEGIDA kein Dialog und kein Entgegenkommen etwas nützen, sondern nur die scharfkantige Kampfansage: nicht mit uns, allerdings.

Ansonsten sage ich voraus, dass, was sich heute vorgeblich friedlich unter die PEGIDA-Fahne stellt, sich morgen, beim nächsten Pogrom, als applaudierende Danebensteherei manifestieren wird. Und der eine oder andere dieser Leute wird, erst noch verstohlen, aber dann von Angst befreit, seinen ersten Stein und seinen ersten Molotovcocktail auf andere Menschen werfen. Und „Russia Today“ – das echte natürlich – wird voller Verständnis über die Selbstermächtigung des deutschen Volkes gegen Fremdbestimmung berichten.

Dr. Anna Veronika Wendland ist Osteuropa-Historikerin mit Schwerpunkt Stadt- und Technikgeschichte, zur Zeit Vertretung der wissenschaftlichen Leitung des Herder-Instituts für historische Ostmitteleuropaforschung in Marburg.

Quelle: Anna Veronika Wendland auf Facebook

Posted in Analytik – Deutsch, Deutsch, Posts - Deutsch | Tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Petr&Mazepa: The armour is strong. Part 3. The world below zero.

Posted on December 14, 2014 by chervonaruta

By Alexander Noinets and one soldier (a whole camp) for Petr & Mazepa
12.09.2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine

"The armor is strong, 3"

“The armor is strong, 3”

To us, in the rear, it doesn’t matter what the Ukrainian soldiers are called. There, at the front, they also don’t care how they’re being called. An army man in general does not like it when someone remembers his surname. The surname is a sign that you are remembered by the high command, and no one expects anything good from the high command. For this reason, here, I will also not mention any names or surnames. In any case, for you and me, all of the stories from the front are stories about “one Ukrainian soldier.” So these are a few notes about one Ukrainian soldier… a soldier who serves in the 28th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

**

  • There are the mobilized ones and the professionals. The professionals pull their weight on their contracts for many years, and they have their own honor and traditions. They are real soldiers, and the others – they are temporary soldiers, not serious. But, generally, just like in prison everyone sits on false charges, here all the mobilized ones are volunteers and came in to enlist themselves. And, unlike in prison, this is not always a lie, and even not always self-convincing. Often that is exactly how it is.

**

  • Our platoon is actually – exemplary. Don’t look at our being dressed haphazardly and our camp looking like some Bedouins stopped off here. Our commanders know their job and they keep the soldiers well. There are some platoons where the officers don’t care at all, and they drink around the clock, and the 19-year-old conscripts are living there all confused, they do not know where to run or what to do, they’ve only had enough training to learn the rule of “don’t look into the barrel while firing.” But we have everything down perfectly.

**

  • How much do you actually sleep?
  • Well, I’m the commander, the big boss. I sleep a lot, about six or seven hours.

**

  • I am proud of the platoon. Generally, of course, keeping these barbarians together is very hard work every minute. But see, we once had a tank column come at us, and everyone stood in the trenches, held their sectors, and no one even made a sound. Although everyone knows that our task, in the event of a serious attack, is to hold out for half an hour. Commander, will we hold out for even half an hour, if that happens?
  • Well, maybe we’ll hold out. What do you want? The job of one Ukrainian soldier at war by all accounts – is to survive for three days. You have exceeded the norms for personnel many times; you’re already on a standard for a Lieutenant Colonel, if you screw with our nerves here for another week.

**

  • I talked to the fighters, and the mobilized ones say – we didn’t come to serve in the army. We’d have dodged from the army; it’s not interesting in the army. We came to the war. We came to fight.
  • And, how is fighting turning out for you?
  • Well, we came to the right place, here it is going well.

**

  • Actually that incident with the column showed that people are divided into two types – those who first of all grab their armor, and those who in that moment first of all grab their assault rifle.
  • And those people who at that moment hide and run?
  • Are those really people? We don’t have them here, we already checked. Our people are maybe not the prettiest or the most educated (actually you are the first person with whom I’m able to talk in complex sentences for the past couple of months), but they are people.

**

  • Actually you can never tell by a person just like that beforehand. You know when warriors gather at the table, they have this marathon: “I am from the ATO, and who are you?” [thing going], and they exchange soldier stories, about blood and guts. And we have this soldier in one unit, when he listens to it, after the third sentence he gets diarrhea. That’s how nervous he is. So, when we disembarked at night into the trenches on alert, he jumped out of the dugout barefoot and stood in the trench barefoot in the snow, only had time to grab his gun and his ammunition. So let him be as nervous as he likes, he is a very correct soldier.

Video: “Idiotic march” song by Oleg Medvedev

  • In my life there were two moments when I was ready to lie down in the snow and die. The first was during a hike in Crimea in a blizzard. The second time – when we drove here to the location for fourteen hours on top of the armored vehicle under the freezing rain. Everything got completely soaked through. The most dry thing we had was a package with some underwear that one fighter was sitting on. We had a dog chase after us from the border guards, so one of our soldiers stole her from them. Yes, he just went and stole her. So that we could warm up against her. The dog was warm.

**

  • We take our personnel very seriously. See, I bought one soldier from a neighbouring platoon for two blocks of Marlboroughs. Because he is a professional soldier, 19 years old, and such a good shooter that God give one of him to everyone, and he knows the radio. Soldier, make me some tea, please. You see? I am a conscript, in the rank of private, yesterday they were initiating me into the Dippers, and he is seven years in the army, a sergeant, but at the rank of a senior shooter. So he makes me tea and not the other way around.
  • Comrade Commander, allow me to report, your orders are executed, your tea is ready. Now go and pick it up yourself, I am not a servant to be handing out tea to you.
  • Do you see? And so we bicker. Coming, soldier.

**

  • One soldier is a hunter and an exhibition shooter. Me, when I shoot – I don’t know if I’ve hit the target or not. But he sees how the bullet flies, he knows exactly whether he hit the target or not. When we shoot – I am aiming somewhere over there, working hard, and he’s already fired and is now shooting birds above us, because he is a hunter.

**

  • Oh, listen, volunteers, can you get us a 12-gauge shotgun? There are lots of partridges here, we can get loads of game; do you know what kind of cook is in our platoon? He’s from the “Trump Card” restaurant. The generals in the army aren’t fed like here in our platoon. Here, try a soldier’s “ukha” [fish soup].

**

  • One soldier we took on because he left Ilovaisk on his own. He walked for two weeks towards his men, but he came out, alone. And he didn’t just come out, many people came out; this one came out with his weapon. He didn’t abandon his weapon and he made it to his own. Good job, I figure.

**

  • I was saved by one conscript. He took an explosion on himself. Now he is in hospital, he has one piece of shrapnel in his nose, another one somewhere in his head, they can’t get it out. We only knew each other for a couple of months, and he saved me and is now in hospital.

**

  • And another one, a career soldier, I served with for four years. My comrade in arms. And, when they deployed us onto our positions during the first ATO, and we stood in the trenches, he dropped a grenade into our trench and ran towards the separatists to surrender. He dropped a grenade onto his former colleagues and ran away. He didn’t make it, of course. For four years we served together, sat at the same table.

Video: “Heart of a snake,” song Oleg Medvedev

  • And in the neighbouring platoon they lured a sniper. Every day two bullets hit their APC. Only two, and always into the APC, and always into the same one. And the soldiers regularly find sniper positions around. They say it’s some kind of woman sniper.
  • Why a woman all of a sudden?
  • Well, so they say.
  • Nonsense talk. Soldiers’ tales.
  • But someone is shooting, right?
  • Someone is shooting.
  • And why?
  • They want to exert psychological pressure. To scare you.
  • Have you seen anyone here be psychologically pressured because of this? Idiots. What pressure? Now if they shot somebody’s balls off, then yes, that would be psychological pressure on him. But they can fire all year long into the APC if they like.

**

  • Psychological pressure is when the soldier gets no news from home. Everyone has buddies, friends in the rear. And when these people stop calling, the soldier gets really upset.
  • Well, some feel bad that they live there in peace while their friends are fighting somewhere. They feel ashamed, uncomfortable, start getting angry at themselves, and don’t call, so as not to remind themselves that there is a war in the country, and that their friends are fighting there.
  • There’s no need to be ashamed of this. You are journalists, right, tell the folks in the rear that this is very important for the soldiers, that there’s no need to be ashamed, the soldier will be happy that he wasn’t forgotten. It is very important that you’re not forgotten. And that someone is at the rear while someone is at the front, well, what use is a front without a rear.
  • Well, there not everyone realizes at all that they are in the rear. They think that they have a peaceful life and not a life in the rear.
  • I think it is about ten thousand coffins. I have a whole theory. The theory of ten thousand coffins. The country does not understand that it is at war. It is necessary for ten thousand coffins to arrive to the rear, so that every second person buries either an acquaintance or a relative. Until then they will keep thinking that all of this is not real and not for long.

**

  • Landlady, we want to put a volunteer up with you. Rent a room, and we’ll pay you.
  • Guys, what money are you talking about, you are helping the army, live here for free; I will heat up the guest room. Are you here for a long time?
  • Well, about three months for now.
  • Why, do you think this tragedy will keep going for three whole months?

(Landlady, it will last even longer, only how can we say this to you?)

Video: “Amazar hawk,” song by Oleg Medvedev

  • Listen, what was that just now? One APC just accelerated and pushed another APC in the rear, and that one started up. Does it always start up like that, with a push?
  • No, God no. This is the first time. Usually that one doesn’t start up at all.

**

  • Hey, soldier, the volunteers are here, let’s give them a ride on an APC. Climb up, hold on.
  • Not bad. But it shakes a lot of course. How you ride on them for 14 hours – I don’t know.
  • Well, this is actually the gentlest and most experienced driver. With the others – now they shake. But you got the tourist variation.
  • Now you’ve gotten a ride, and it was quite similar to a Bedouin stop. Only instead of camels you have APCs.

**

  • Actually, so far the biggest discovery that our soldiers have made in this war is that there are socks for ten Euros a pair, which you sent to us. And that you can wear these magical socks for a week, and your feet still don’t stink. The whole soldier stinks but his feet don’t. So basically our machine gun is from 1979, the APCs are older than me, I even dread to think by how much, but at least in our shoes the 21st Century has arrived.

**

  • We badly need a car. We have armor. We drive on the armor. But we can’t drive our stuff, there’s no truck or anything. So for us, each move is equivalent to two fires. Find us any car, a jeep, a minivan, does not matter, because otherwise everything you are sending to us will just get lost every time we move.

**

  • And do not pay attention to what we look like. Look around you, here it’s all snow, mud, oil and slag heaps. Everything you bring us, after two days, will look like a great-grandma’s sweater. And we have loads of great-grandmas’ sweaters, here, look, half a dugout of various rags. We are not cold, we just look like bums. But then again, for snipers we are not a priority target, you see, they can’t tell where the commander is, who to fire at, they shoot at the APC from hopelessness. Bring us kits for weapons. We need scopes, we need binoculars, we need a thermal imager, Picatinny rails, collimators. We need to shoot.

**

  • We have one Ukrainian soldier here. His surname is Siliveystr. We have no surnames here, just call signs. And he has not only a call sign, but also a surname. Siliveystr. Because he wants a street in his village to be named after him when he dies. The village is small, so he has a chance there. Only don’t forget. Siliveystr is his surname.

Video: “Carlson,” song by Oleg Medvedev

———-

Cards for the transfer of funds:

Yandex purse: 41001690315741

We have got six new cards at once, specifically for volunteering needs, finally.

The first and second are in dollars and euros, for buying everything, if you do not have moral limitations about what you are prepared to spend your money on. We will not buy weapons for them but will, for example, buy firearms kit and magazines.

In UAH: 4731185603709285 – Elena Noinets

In USD: BENEFICIARY – NOINETS OLENA

ACCOUNT — 4731185603709756

BANK OF BENEFICIARY — PRIVATBANK SWIFT CODE: PBANUA2X

INTERMEDIARY BANK — JP MORGAN CHASE BANK SWIFT CODE: CHASUS33

CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT — 0011000080

IBAN — UA223052990004731185603709756

The third and fourth are in dollars and hryvnias if you have certain moral restrictions and you are not willing to sponsor firearms kits. It is planned that money from the card will go to warm clothes, stoves and the like.

In UAH: 4731185603709301 – Elena Noinets

In USD: BENEFICIARY — NOINETS OLENA

ACCOUNT — 4731185603709772

BANK OF BENEFICIARY — PRIVATBANK SWIFT CODE: PBANUA2X

INTERMEDIARY BANK — JP MORGAN CHASE BANK SWIFT CODE: CHASUS33

CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT — 0011000080

IBAN — UA753052990004731185603709772

Click on any image to enlarge or view slide show:

And some photos, from the fighters, of the humanitarian aid. Here is a mix of ours and of the Lorenzo family. Because they came on the same day and the fighters sorted them at the same time without looking whose was what. In general, we have already agreed with the Lorenzos, as they are fantastically effective buyers that the soldiers are delighted with, that we gather the money, and they coordinate the purchases, and report here. Generally from a technological point of view it is an increase in efficiency – we accumulate the resource well, they manage it well. Enlargement and coordination as is.

Source: Petr&Mazepa

Posted in English, English News, Eyewitness stories, Help for ukrainian army, Pictures, South&Eastern Ukraine, Video, War in Donbas | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (full text)

Posted on December 13, 2014 by chervonaruta

Yesterday was an extremely significant day for Ukraine in the US Congress. Below you will find the final version of S. 2828 – the Sens. Menendez and Corker bill (with Helsinki Commission Chair Sen. Ben Cardin and Sen. Ed Markey as the original cosponsors).  It differs a bit from the introduced version because compromises had to be made in order to ensure Senate passage yesterday early afternoon.  That’s just the nature of the legislative process.  It’s still an extremely important bill.  Also, late last night, S. 2828 passed the House as H.R. 5859, a Reps. Gerlach and Kaptur bill. The House bill is exactly the same as S. 2828 as passed yesterday afternoon, so don’t worry about why bill numbers are different etc. – these are technical/procedural matters; not substantive.  One final note –throughout more than three decades of my professional work, I have occasionally seen strong advocacy efforts on behalf of various Ukraine-related legislation, but never have I seen such intense, concentrated advocacy by the Ukrainian-American community and other numerous friends of Ukraine as yesterday afternoon and evening to ensure House passage of S. 2828.  Kudos! Now the bill goes to the President.  (And also keep in mind that with yesterday’s passage of the overall spending bill, Ukraine receives significant funding for various programs to help counter Russian aggression and to strengthen its economy and democracy.)
–Orest Deychakiwsky, CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe]

 

113th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 2828

AN ACT

To impose sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation, to provide additional assistance to Ukraine, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014′.

(b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Definitions.

Sec. 3. Statement of policy regarding Ukraine.

Sec. 4. Sanctions relating to the defense and energy sectors of the Russian Federation.

Sec. 5. Sanctions on Russian and other foreign financial institutions.

Sec. 6. Increased military assistance for the Government of Ukraine.

Sec. 7. Expanded nonmilitary assistance for Ukraine.

Sec. 8. Expanded broadcasting in countries of the former Soviet Union.

Sec. 9. Support for Russian democracy and civil society organizations.

Sec. 10. Report on non-compliance by the Russian Federation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

Sec. 11. Rule of construction.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT- The terms `account’, `correspondent account’, and `payable-through account’ have the meanings given those terms in section 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate congressional committees’ means–

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

(3) DEFENSE ARTICLE; DEFENSE SERVICE; TRAINING- The terms `defense article’, `defense service’, and `training’ have the meanings given those terms in section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).

(4) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION- The term `financial institution’ means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.

(5) FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION- The term `foreign financial institution’ has the meaning given that term in section 561.308 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).

(6) FOREIGN PERSON- The term `foreign person’ means any individual or entity that is not a United States citizen, a permanent resident alien, or an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States.

(7) KNOWINGLY- The term `knowingly’, with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person has actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.

(8) RUSSIAN PERSON- The term `Russian person’ means–

(A) an individual who is a citizen or national of the Russian Federation; or

(B) an entity organized under the laws of the Russian Federation.

(9) SPECIAL RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL PROJECT- The term `special Russian crude oil project’ means a project intended to extract crude oil from–

(A) the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation in waters more than 500 feet deep;

(B) Russian Arctic offshore locations; or

(C) shale formations located in the Russian Federation.

SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UKRAINE.

It is the policy of the United States to further assist the Government of Ukraine in restoring its sovereignty and territorial integrity to deter the Government of the Russian Federation from further destabilizing and invading Ukraine and other independent countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. That policy shall be carried into effect, among other things, through a comprehensive effort, in coordination with allies and partners of the United States where appropriate, that includes economic sanctions, diplomacy, assistance for the people of Ukraine, and the provision of military capabilities to the Government of Ukraine that will enhance the ability of that Government to defend itself and to restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of unlawful actions by the Government of the Russian Federation.

SEC. 4. SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE AND ENERGY SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

(a) Sanctions Relating to the Defense Sector-

(1) ROSOBORONEXPORT- Except as provided in subsection (d), not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to Rosoboronexport.

(2) RUSSIAN PRODUCERS, TRANSFERORS, OR BROKERS OF DEFENSE ARTICLES- Except as provided in subsection (d), on and after the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person the President determines–

(A) is an entity–

(i) owned or controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation or owned or controlled by nationals of the Russian Federation; and

(ii) that–

(I) knowingly manufactures or sells defense articles transferred into Syria or into the territory of a specified country without the consent of the internationally recognized government of that country;

(II) transfers defense articles into Syria or into the territory of a specified country without the consent of the internationally recognized government of that country; or

(III) brokers or otherwise assists in the transfer of defense articles into Syria or into the territory of a specified country without the consent of the internationally recognized government of that country; or

(B) knowingly, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an entity described in subparagraph (A) with respect to an activity described in clause (ii) of that subparagraph.

(3) SPECIFIED COUNTRY DEFINED-

(A) IN GENERAL- In this subsection, the term `specified country’ means–

(i) Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; and

(ii) any other country designated by the President as a country of significant concern for purposes of this subsection, such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the Central Asia republics.

(B) NOTICE TO CONGRESS- The President shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days before–

(i) designating a country as a country of significant concern under subparagraph (A)(ii); or

(ii) terminating a designation under that subparagraph, including the termination of any such designation pursuant to subsection (h).

(b) Sanctions Related to the Energy Sector-

(1) DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIAL RUSSIAN CRUDE OIL PROJECTS- Except as provided in subsection (d), on and after the date that is 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President may impose 3 or more of the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign person if the President determines that the foreign person knowingly makes a significant investment in a special Russian crude oil project.

(2) AUTHORIZATION FOR EXTENSION OF LICENSING LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN EQUIPMENT- The President, through the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce or the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, as appropriate, may impose additional licensing requirements for or other restrictions on the export or reexport of items for use in the energy sector of the Russian Federation, including equipment used for tertiary oil recovery.

(3) CONTINGENT SANCTION RELATING TO GAZPROM- If the President determines that Gazprom is withholding significant natural gas supplies from member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or further withholds significant natural gas supplies from countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova, the President shall, not later than 45 days after making that determination, impose the sanction described in subsection (c)(7) and at least one additional sanction described in subsection (c) with respect to Gazprom.

(c) Sanctions Described- The sanctions the President may impose with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a) or (b) are the following:

(1) EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ASSISTANCE- The President may direct the Export-Import Bank of the United States not to approve the issuance of any guarantee, insurance, extension of credit, or participation in the extension of credit in connection with the export of any goods or services to the foreign person.

(2) PROCUREMENT SANCTION- The President may prohibit the head of any executive agency (as defined in section 133 of title 41, United States Code) from entering into any contract for the procurement of any goods or services from the foreign person.

(3) ARMS EXPORT PROHIBITION- The President may prohibit the exportation or provision by sale, lease or loan, grant, or other means, directly or indirectly, of any defense article or defense service to the foreign person and the issuance of any license or other approval to the foreign person under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778).

(4) DUAL-USE EXPORT PROHIBITION- The President may prohibit the issuance of any license and suspend any license for the transfer to the foreign person of any item the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (as in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)) or the Export Administration Regulations under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.

(5) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS- The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any person from–

(A) acquiring, holding, withholding, using, transferring, withdrawing, transporting, or exporting any property that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and with respect to which the foreign person has any interest;

(B) dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to such property; or

(C) conducting any transaction involving such property.

(6) BANKING TRANSACTIONS- The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers of credit or payments between financial institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and involve any interest of the foreign person.

(7) PROHIBITION ON INVESTMENT IN EQUITY OR DEBT OF SANCTIONED PERSON- The President may, pursuant to such regulations as the President may prescribe, prohibit any United States person from transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in–

(A) debt–

(i) of longer than 30 days’ maturity of a foreign person with respect to which sanctions are imposed under subsection (a) or of longer than 90 days’ maturity of a foreign person with respect to which sanctions are imposed under subsection (b); and

(ii) issued on or after the date on which such sanctions are imposed with respect to the foreign person; or

(B) equity of the foreign person issued on or after that date.

(8) EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND REVOCATION OF VISA OR OTHER DOCUMENTATION- In the case of a foreign person who is an individual, the President may direct the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to exclude from the United States, the foreign person, subject to regulatory exceptions to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.

(9) SANCTIONS ON PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICERS- In the case of a foreign person that is an entity, the President may impose on the principal executive officer or officers of the foreign person, or on individuals performing similar functions and with similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions described in this subsection applicable to individuals.

(d) Exceptions-

(1) IMPORTATION OF GOODS-

(A) IN GENERAL- The authority to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under subsection (c)(5) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

(B) GOOD DEFINED- In this paragraph, the term `good’ has the meaning given that term in section 16 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415) (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)).

(2) ADDITIONAL EXCEPTIONS- The President shall not be required to apply or maintain the sanctions under subsection (a) or (b)–

(A) in the case of procurement of defense articles or defense services under existing contracts, subcontracts, or other business agreements, including ancillary or incidental contracts for goods, or for services or funding (including necessary financial services) associated with such goods, as necessary to give effect to such contracts, subcontracts, or other business agreements, and the exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy requirements essential to the national security of the United States–

(i) if the President determines in writing that–

(I) the foreign person to which the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a sole source supplier of the defense articles or services;

(II) the defense articles or services are essential;

(III) alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available; and

(IV) the national interests of the United States would be adversely affected by the application or maintenance of such sanctions; or

(ii) if the President determines in writing that–

(I) such articles or services are essential to the national security under defense coproduction agreements; and

(II) the national interests of the United States would be adversely affected by the application or maintenance of such sanctions;

(B) in the case of procurement, to eligible products, as defined in section 308(4) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. 2518(4)), of any foreign country or instrumentality designated under section 301(b)(1) of that Act (19 U.S.C. 2511(b)(1));

(C) to products, technology, or services provided under contracts, subcontracts, or other business agreements (including ancillary or incidental contracts for goods, or for services or funding (including necessary financial services) associated with such goods, as necessary to give effect to such contracts, subcontracts, or other business agreements) entered into before the date on which the President publishes in the Federal Register the name of the foreign person with respect to which the sanctions are to be imposed;

(D) to–

(i) spare parts that are essential to United States products or production;

(ii) component parts, but not finished products, essential to United States products or production; or

(iii) routine servicing and maintenance of United States products, to the extent that alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available;

(E) to information and technology essential to United States products or production; or

(F) to food, medicine, medical devices, or agricultural commodities (as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (22 U.S.C. 8511)).

(e) National Security Waiver-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a foreign person if the President–

(A) determines that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the determination and the reasons for the determination.

(2) FORM OF REPORT- The report required by paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(f) Transaction-specific National Security Waiver-

(1) IN GENERAL- The President may waive the application of sanctions under subsection (a) or (b) with respect to a specific transaction if the President–

(A) determines that the transaction is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(B) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the determination and the specific reasons for the determination that a waiver with respect to the transaction is necessary and appropriate.

(2) FORM OF REPORT- The report required by paragraph (1)(B) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(g) Implementation; Penalties-

(1) IMPLEMENTATION- The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out the purposes of this section.

(2) PENALTIES- The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, or causes a violation of, subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under either such subsection, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

(h) Termination-

(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), this section, and sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, supporting, or financing, significant acts intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, including through an agreement between the appropriate parties.

(2) APPLICABILITY WITH RESPECT TO SYRIA- The termination date under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to the provisions of subsection (a) relating to the transfer of defense articles into Syria or sanctions imposed pursuant to such provisions.

SEC. 5. SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

(a) Facilitation of Certain Defense- and Energy-related Transactions- The President may impose the sanction described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign financial institution that the President determines knowingly engages, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, in significant transactions involving activities described in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (B) of section 4(a)(2) or paragraph (1) or (3) of section 4(b) for persons with respect to which sanctions are imposed under section 4.

(b) Facilitation of Financial Transactions on Behalf of Specially Designated Nationals- The President may impose the sanction described in subsection (c) with respect to a foreign financial institution if the President determines that the foreign financial institution has, on or after the date that is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly facilitated a significant financial transaction on behalf of any Russian person included on the list of specially designated nationals and blocked persons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury, pursuant to–

(1) this Act;

(2) Executive Order 13660 (79 Fed. Reg. 13,493), 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15,535), or 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16,169); or

(3) any other executive order addressing the crisis in Ukraine.

(c) Sanction Described- The sanction described in this subsection is, with respect to a foreign financial institution, a prohibition on the opening, and a prohibition or the imposition of strict conditions on the maintaining, in the United States of a correspondent account or a payable-through account by the foreign financial institution.

(d) National Security Waiver- The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section with respect to a foreign financial institution if the President–

(1) determines that the waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the determination and the reasons for the determination.

(e) Implementation; Penalties-

(1) IMPLEMENTATION- The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out the purposes of this section.

(2) PENALTIES- The penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, or causes a violation of, subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or an order or regulation prescribed under either such subsection, to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 206(a) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

(f) Termination- This section, and sanctions imposed under this section, shall terminate on the date on which the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees the certification described in section 4(h).

SEC. 6. INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE.

(a) In General- The President is authorized to provide defense articles, defense services, and training to the Government of Ukraine for the purpose of countering offensive weapons and reestablishing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including anti-tank and anti-armor weapons, crew weapons and ammunition, counter-artillery radars to identify and target artillery batteries, fire control, range finder, and optical and guidance and control equipment, tactical troop-operated surveillance drones, and secure command and communications equipment, pursuant to the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), and other relevant provisions of law.

(b) Report Required- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a report detailing the anticipated defense articles, defense services, and training to be provided pursuant to this section and a timeline for the provision of such defense articles, defense services, and training, to–

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(c) Authorization of Appropriations-

(1) IN GENERAL- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $100,000,000 for fiscal year 2015, $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2016, and $125,000,000 for fiscal year 2017 to carry out activities under this section.

(2) AVAILABILITY OF AMOUNTS- Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available for obligation and expenditure through the end of fiscal year 2018.

(d) Authority for the Use of Funds- The funds made available pursuant to subsection (c) for provision of defense articles, defense services, and training may be used to procure such articles, services, and training from the United States Government or other appropriate sources.

(e) Protection of Civilians- It is the sense of Congress that the Government of Ukraine should take all appropriate steps to protect civilians.

SEC. 7. EXPANDED NONMILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE.

(a) Assistance to Internally Displaced People in Ukraine-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit a plan, including actions by the United States Government, other governments, and international organizations, to meet the need for protection of and assistance for internally displaced persons in Ukraine, to–

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

(2) ELEMENTS- The plan required by paragraph (1) should include, as appropriate, activities in support of–

(A) helping to establish a functional and adequately resourced central registration system in Ukraine that can ensure coordination of efforts to provide assistance to internally displaced persons in different regions;

(B) encouraging adoption of legislation in Ukraine that protects internally displaced persons from discrimination based on their status and provides simplified procedures for obtaining the new residency registration or other official documentation that is a prerequisite to receiving appropriate social payments under the laws of Ukraine, such as pensions and disability, child, and unemployment benefits; and

(C) helping to ensure that information is available to internally displaced persons about–

(i) government agencies and independent groups that can provide assistance to such persons in various regions; and

(ii) evacuation assistance available to persons seeking to flee armed conflict areas.

(3) ASSISTANCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS- The President shall instruct the United States permanent representative or executive director, as the case may be, to the relevant United Nations voluntary agencies, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and other appropriate international organizations, to use the voice and vote of the United States to support appropriate assistance for internally displaced persons in Ukraine.

(b) Assistance to the Defense Sector of Ukraine- The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense should assist entities in the defense sector of Ukraine to reorient exports away from customers in the Russian Federation and to find appropriate alternative markets for those entities in the defense sector of Ukraine that have already significantly reduced exports to and cooperation with entities in the defense sector of the Russian Federation.

(c) Assistance To Address the Energy Crisis in Ukraine-

(1) EMERGENCY ENERGY ASSISTANCE-

(A) PLAN REQUIRED- The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Energy, in collaboration with the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall work with officials of the Government of Ukraine to develop a short-term emergency energy assistance plan designed to help Ukraine address the potentially severe short-term heating fuel and electricity shortages facing Ukraine in 2014 and 2015.

(B) ELEMENTS- The plan required by subparagraph (A) should include strategies to address heating fuel and electricity shortages in Ukraine, including, as appropriate–

(i) the acquisition of short-term, emergency fuel supplies;

(ii) the repair or replacement of infrastructure that could impede the transmission of electricity or transportation of fuel;

(iii) the prioritization of the transportation of fuel supplies to the areas where such supplies are needed most;

(iv) streamlining emergency communications throughout national, regional, and local governments to manage the potential energy crisis resulting from heating fuel and electricity shortages;

(v) forming a crisis management team within the Government of Ukraine to specifically address the potential crisis, including ensuring coordination of the team’s efforts with the efforts of outside governmental and nongovernmental entities providing assistance to address the potential crisis; and

(vi) developing a public outreach strategy to facilitate preparation by the population and communication with the population in the event of a crisis.

(C) ASSISTANCE- The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development are authorized to provide assistance in support of, and to invest in short-term solutions for, enabling Ukraine to secure the energy safety of the people of Ukraine during 2014 and 2015, including through–

(i) procurement and transport of emergency fuel supplies, including reverse pipeline flows from Europe;

(ii) provision of technical assistance for crisis planning, crisis response, and public outreach;

(iii) repair of infrastructure to enable the transport of fuel supplies;

(iv) repair of power generating or power transmission equipment or facilities;

(v) procurement and installation of compressors or other appropriate equipment to enhance short-term natural gas production;

(vi) procurement of mobile electricity generation units;

(vii) conversion of natural gas heating facilities to run on other fuels, including alternative energy sources; and

(viii) provision of emergency weatherization and winterization materials and supplies.

(2) REDUCTION OF UKRAINE’S RELIANCE ON ENERGY IMPORTS-

(A) PLANS REQUIRED- The Secretary of State, in collaboration with the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, shall work with officials of the Government of Ukraine to develop medium- and long-term plans to increase energy production and efficiency to increase energy security by helping Ukraine reduce its dependence on natural gas imported from the Russian Federation.

(B) ELEMENTS- The medium- and long-term plans required by subparagraph (A) should include strategies, as appropriate, to–

(i) improve corporate governance and unbundling of state-owned oil and gas sector firms;

(ii) increase production from natural gas fields and from other sources, including renewable energy;

(iii) license new oil and gas blocks transparently and competitively;

(iv) modernize oil and gas upstream infrastructure; and

(v) improve energy efficiency.

(C) PRIORITIZATION- The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Energy should, during fiscal years 2015 through 2018, work with other donors, including multilateral agencies and nongovernmental organizations, to prioritize, to the extent practicable and as appropriate, the provision of assistance from such donors to help Ukraine to improve energy efficiency, increase energy supplies produced in Ukraine, and reduce reliance on energy imports from the Russian Federation, including natural gas.

(D) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 in the aggregate for fiscal years 2016 through 2018 to carry out activities under this paragraph.

(3) SUPPORT FROM THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION- The Overseas Private Investment Corporation shall–

(A) prioritize, to the extent practicable, support for investments to help increase energy efficiency, develop domestic oil and natural gas reserves, improve and repair electricity infrastructure, and develop renewable and other sources of energy in Ukraine; and

(B) implement procedures for expedited review and, as appropriate, approval, of applications by eligible investors (as defined in section 238 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2198)) for loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for such investments.

(4) SUPPORT BY THE WORLD BANK GROUP AND THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT- The President shall, to the extent practicable and as appropriate, direct the United States Executive Directors of the World Bank Group and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to encourage the World Bank Group and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other international financial institutions–

(A) to invest in, and increase their efforts to promote investment in, projects to improve energy efficiency, improve and repair electricity infrastructure, develop domestic oil and natural gas reserves, and develop renewable and other sources of energy in Ukraine; and

(B) to stimulate private investment in such projects.

(d) Assistance to Civil Society in Ukraine-

(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall, directly or through nongovernmental or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, and related organizations–

(A) strengthen the organizational and operational capacity of democratic civil society in Ukraine;

(B) support the efforts of independent media outlets to broadcast, distribute, and share information in all regions of Ukraine;

(C) counter corruption and improve transparency and accountability of institutions that are part of the Government of Ukraine; and

(D) provide support for democratic organizing and election monitoring in Ukraine.

(2) STRATEGY REQUIRED- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to carry out the activities described in paragraph (1) to–

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2016 to carry out this subsection.

(4) TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENTS- Any assistance provided pursuant to this subsection shall be conducted in as transparent of a manner as possible, consistent with the nature and goals of this subsection. The President shall provide a briefing on the activities funded by this subsection at the request of the committees specified in paragraph (2).

SEC. 8. EXPANDED BROADCASTING IN COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors shall submit to Congress a plan, including a cost estimate, for immediately and substantially increasing, and maintaining through fiscal year 2017, the quantity of Russian-language broadcasting into the countries of the former Soviet Union funded by the United States in order to counter Russian Federation propaganda.

(b) Prioritization of Broadcasting Into Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova- The plan required by subsection (a) shall prioritize broadcasting into Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

(c) Additional Priorities- In developing the plan required by subsection (a), the Chairman shall consider–

(1) near-term increases in Russian-language broadcasting for countries of the former Soviet Union (other than the countries specified in subsection (b)), including Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; and

(2) increases in broadcasting in other critical languages, including Ukrainian and Romanian languages.

(d) Broadcasting Defined- In this section, the term `broadcasting’ means the distribution of media content via radio broadcasting, television broadcasting, and Internet-based platforms, among other platforms.

(e) Authorization of Appropriations-

(1) IN GENERAL- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2018 to carry out activities under this section.

(2) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT- Amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall supplement and not supplant other amounts made available for activities described in this section.

SEC. 9. SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.

(a) In General- The Secretary of State shall, directly or through nongovernmental or international organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the National Endowment for Democracy, and related organizations–

(1) improve democratic governance, transparency, accountability, rule of law, and anti-corruption efforts in the Russian Federation;

(2) strengthen democratic institutions and political and civil society organizations in the Russian Federation;

(3) expand uncensored Internet access in the Russian Federation; and

(4) expand free and unfettered access to independent media of all kinds in the Russian Federation, including through increasing United States Government-supported broadcasting activities, and assist with the protection of journalists and civil society activists who have been targeted for free speech activities.

(b) Authorization of Appropriations- There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2016 through 2018 to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a).

(c) Strategy Requirement- Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a strategy to carry out the activities set forth in subsection (a) to–

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(d) Transparency Requirements- Any assistance provided pursuant to this section shall be conducted in as transparent of a manner as possible, consistent with the nature and goals of this section. The President shall provide a briefing on the activities funded by this section at the request of the committees specified in subsection (c).

SEC. 10. REPORT ON NON-COMPLIANCE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INF TREATY.

(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington December 8, 1987, and entered into force June 1, 1988 (commonly referred to as the `Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty’ or `INF Treaty’).

(2) This behavior poses a threat to the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that–

(1) the President should hold the Russian Federation accountable for being in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty; and

(2) the President should demand the Russian Federation completely and verifiably eliminate the military systems that constitute the violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

(c) Report-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the committees specified in subsection (d) a report that includes the following elements:

(A) A description of the status of the President’s efforts, in cooperation with United States allies, to hold the Russian Federation accountable for being in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty and obtain the complete and verifiable elimination of its military systems that constitute the violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

(B) The President’s assessment as to whether it remains in the national security interests of the United States to remain a party to the INF Treaty, and other related treaties and agreements, while the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

(C) Notification of any deployment by the Russian Federation of a ground launched ballistic or cruise missile system with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

(D) A plan developed by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), to verify that the Russian Federation has fully and completely dismantled any ground launched cruise missiles or ballistic missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including details on facilities that inspectors need access to, people inspectors need to talk with, how often inspectors need the accesses for, and how much the verification regime would cost.

(2) FORM- The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex.

(d) Committees Specified- The committees specified in this subsection are–

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this Act or an amendment made by this Act shall be construed as an authorization for the use of military force.

Passed the Senate December 11, 2014.

Attest:

Secretary.

113th CONGRESS

2d Session

S. 2828

AN ACT

To impose sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation, to provide additional assistance to Ukraine, and for other purposes.

END

US House of Representatives

H.R.5859 
Latest Title: To impose sanctions with respect to the Russian Federation, to provide additional assistance to Ukraine, and for other purposes. 
Sponsor: Rep Gerlach, Jim [PA-6] (introduced 12/11/2014)      Cosponsors (1) 
Latest Major Action: 12/11/2014 Passed/agreed to in House. Status: On passage Passed without objection. 
Latest Action: 12/11/2014 Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.

Posted in "Voices" in English, Appeals, English, News summary, War in Donbas | Tagged , , , , , | 2 Comments

Dmitry Tymchuk: Concerning Ukrainian POWs and Hostages

Posted on December 12, 2014 by M. Stanislav

Dmitry Tymchuk, Head of the Center for Military and Political Research, Coordinator of the Information Resistance group, Member of Parliament (People’s Front)
12.11.2014

Yesterday, at the meeting of the Verkhovna Rada [Parliamentary] committee in the issues of national security and defense, representatives of the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine], the Ministry of Defense, and the National Guard of Ukraine spoke concerning the situation with the release of prisoners.

A definite positive fact is that to date, a total of 1,267 persons (military servicemen and civilians) have been freed, through the efforts of the interdepartmental center with the SBU (in cooperation with the MoD, MIA, NGU, and the State Border Service). However, 684 identified persons still remain captive, and 1,667 more are considered missing (some of them have been captured by terrorists).

As explained by the Head of the SBU Central Investigation Department, the situation is very complicated. Back in September, at the Minsk negotiations, the Ukrainian side demanded that the terrorists provide complete lists of our citizens who have been taken prisoner by insurgents and Russians. The terrorists swore to do that. However, we all know how little their promises are worth, as we are yet to see these lists. Therefore, negotiations [on prisoner release] are conducted in an “extended” format – insurgents provide information about separate prisoners (or small groups of them), and then a decision is made to exchange them for some of the captive terrorists.

Another reason why it is impossible to implement the original suggestion by the Ukrainian side and exchange “everyone for everyone” is because some of the hostages are held by gangs that, supposedly, obey neither the “LNR” [Luhansk People’s Republic] nor the “DNR” [Donetsk People’s Republic]. Obviously, this issue could be resolved by Moscow, because not a single gang in Donbas could exist without its help. But again, Russia is allegedly “entirely unrelated” to the conflict in Donbas…

In general, Putin’s “denial game” and Ukraine’s “peaceful status” together constitute the main problem. Russia’s aggression has not been recognized legally, so, from a legal standpoint, there is no war. Therefore, captured Ukrainian military servicemen are not prisoners of war (de jure they are the terrorists’ hostages), and international laws concerning prisoners of war do not apply to them. The same is true on our side: insurgents who are kept behind bars right now are not prisoners, but persons arrested or detained for terrorist activity, and kept in custody by a court ruling, as ordinary convicts.

In the end, any work done to free the prisoners has next to no legal grounds, because, legally, there are no prisoners to speak of. The whole thing is basically improvisation. This is what happens when Ukraine, which has been at war for nine months now, is legally in a state of “peace.”

At the same time, representatives of government ministries pointed out some shortcomings in the legislation, which, if removed, would help intensify the work aimed at prisoner (hostage) release. That concerns, for example, the procedure for release of detained terrorists from custody and their transfer for exchange. The Verkhovna Rada committee in issues for national security and defense will be initiating resolution of these issues in the nearest future.

Source: Dmitry Tymchuk FB

Posted in Analytics, Dmitry Tymchuk, English, English News, South&Eastern Ukraine, War in Donbas | Tagged , , , , , , , | Leave a comment