Konstantin Mashovets, Coordinator, Information Resistance group
10.06.2014 – 8:30
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine
The “Crossing the Dnieper” [Dnipro*] Syndrome:
Here’s the Summary up to the weekend of October 4-5, 2014 (for the previous summary, please see Summary for September 30, 2014).
1. The fact that the ceasefire satisfies no one is obvious. Still, the intensity of fighting, with the exception of several areas and districts, has decreased. This situation cannot help but evoke concern, especially in light of the fact that neither side has achieved its goals.
And, if the command of the Ukrainian troops prefers not to stand out too much and not speak about their future plans, the vato–cephalus are not only berserk with fury and determination when attacking the positions of the Ukrainian army, but also do not tire of shouting left and right that they will “reach Kyiv.” We would like to note in this regard that before closing their mouths, the Colorado-warriers and the vato-command should learn to independently (without RuSSian support) wipe their own noses and pull up their pants. And then go to Kyiv…
That being said, these undeveloped Napoleons (like Motorola) are brash and sharp-tongued now, when the Russian regular army participates in battle, when about 2.5-3 thousand RuSSo-vato-servicemen took up positions in Nedo-rossiya [Editor: not-quite Russia, ironic play on ‘Novo-rossiya’]. But this cannot go on forever…
However, let us return to the situation “at the front…”
2. On the [maritime] Prymorske sector near Mariupol, after a brief respite, another vato-armored-group (including 5-6) tanks that arrived in the past few days, opened fire at Ukrainian positions near the villages of Zhovten–Kulykove, and then attacked the village of Pavlopil, where smart Kadyrovites decided to set up a ferry for their armored equipment over the Kalmius. As we can see, the vato-rebels do not tire of their idiotic attempts to find a corridor between Sartana and Pavlopil to take over Mariupol [in the south] from the North. This time they decided to make an attempt at the left flank of the Mariupol group of the Ukrainian armed forces.
Active attacks on the part of the vatnik intelligence and sabotage groups [DRG] continue on the same road with the goal to investigate the Pavlopil–Hnutove–Klyuchevoye-Hranitne strip. In addition, they are actively trying to influence the communications in this district by concentrating their main efforts on the road marked “H20” between Mariupol and Donetsk, in order to create preconditions for the isolation of the Mariupol district [that’s been] fortified by the Ukrainian army.
From the point of view of further combat, I think that the vato-command views the Prymorske road as one of the most important ones. At least several external characteristics testify to this:
• The Colorado-gangs and RuSSian troops continue to maintain a significant grouping of armed forces on this road (up to 5 thousand people). Which, by the way, is being permanently reinforced by various forces and means – this is where a quite powerful artillery group is located (up to 2 joint divisions of barrel artillery, as well as an individual reactive artillery group including 2-3 MLRS Uragan systems. This is where for the past several days more RuSSian BTG [Battalion-sized Tactical Groups] with reinforcements were being sent (comprised of one motorized JUVO [South Military District] group based in the Northern Caucasus), and this is where a special RTR [Russian Television and Radio] and REB [Radio-electronic warfare, i.e.: electronic warfare] group has arrived.
• The enemy is leading a quite insistent comprehensive exploration of the battle formations and positions of Ukrainian troops in this direction. Not only by using the forces of the local rebels but more so by using the regular intelligence structures of the Russian regular troops.
• An entire complex of measures to hide and misinform is being carried out here, with the goal to hide the number, composition and structure of the group deployed. And most importantly, very active measures are taken to disguise and conceal the intentions of the vato-commandants here. In particular, by means of heightened activity in other areas and on other roads, there is dissemination of false information about the transfer, regrouping and reinforcement of vato-formations.
There are still a number of signs that indicate that the Mariupol direction is considered by the terrorist-Russian command as one of the main POSSIBLE directions for further advance. It is best not to speak of them, for obvious reasons…
In my subjective opinion, the most probable direction of attack by the vato-formations on this site will look about as follows: using the main forces from the border Krasnoarmiiske–Kominternovo to the Kremenivka–Klyuchevoye border (the short-term goal), and later towards Manhush and Volodarskiy [Kyiv District] (the next goal).
3. A little to the north of the Primorye area, near the Starohnativske District, a foothold of the Ukrainian troops on its left flank, the formation of yet another potentially vato-hazardous area continues. I am talking about the region near Olhinka, Novotroitske and Mykolaivka.
In fact, after the mutually unsuccessful attempts made by both sides to test each other on the right flank of this foothold near Hranitne and Svobodne in Telmanovsky district, each side turned their attention towards the opposite flank of the foothold. However, in the beginning, the vatas [translates to cottonheads] frolicked near Telmanovo, having brought here its reinforced RTG in order to immediately negate the temptation on the part of the Ukrainian command to cut off the Telmanovo group from the Novoazovsk ‘silent troops’ on the T0508 road (Novoazovsk-Donetsk), and then gradually started to build up the composition of this group. And once upon a time, they decided in the district of Hranitne, to designate the covering actions towards the Dmytrivka-Polkove border by themselves. The cottonheads were ‘pleasantly surprised’ to encounter a harsh rebuttal here. No wonder, the ‘Ilovaisk story’ seems to have taught the Ukrainian command a lesson. At least it turned out that the Starohnativsky foothold of the Ukrainian army is covered by significantly powerful flank groups.
However, we should point out that, in the general context of the situation, it is unlikely that this foothold becomes a “secondary” area after all. It is a no-brainer that here, the vatniks are planning some sort of “Stalin’s blow.” This is why:
• Redirection of the main forces towards the left flank of the Ukrainian foothold by the “Colorado Beetle” [terrorist] command, and the latter’s unequivocal focus on Volnovakha are quite justified. Because it does not take a tactical genius to understand that SIMULTANEOUS and convergent strikes on the coastal direction and in the Volnovakha area, if successful, will, as a minimum, allow the vatniks to seriously inconvenience Ukrainian troops, and as a maximum, virtually crush the entire southern sector of the Ukrainian defense forces.
• Gradual build-up of the vatnik troop formations in the Dokuchaievsk–Olhinka–Novotroitske area, until it becomes the same size as the formation in the Novoazovsk area, is explained by the wishes of the vatnik command to create an instrument that will solve two tactical tasks at once. These tasks can be described as the small task and the big task…
A) The small task – surrounding and destroying Ukrainian troops that hold the Starohnativka–Prokhorivka area, by converging strikes, one on Dmitrivka from the Olhinka–Novotroitske line, and another, in the same direction, from the Nova Marivka–Hrihorivka direction, through Andreyivka and Donskoye (to that effect, a strike group of vatnik forces must be ADDITIONALLY deployed and reinforced near Telmanovo).
B) The big task – surrounding and destroying Ukrainian troops, both on the Starohnativka foothold and in the Mariupol area (de facto – crushing the entire southern flank of the ATO formation). To accomplish this, vatniks will have to focus their MAIN efforts in the Volnovakha direction. Basically, they would have to make THREE strikes simultaneously. The most powerful one, from the Olhinka–Novotroitske line, on Dmitrivka and then onwards to Volodarske; the second, a splitting attack from Telmanovo; and the third one (but the second strongest) – from the Kominternovo–Krasnoarmeyske line on Kasyanovka and then onwards to Mahush and Volodarske. On top of everything else, to carry out an operation like this, vatniks will require a lot of reserves – both to reinforce the troops during the operation, and then to secure the conquered lines. We think that this is the reason why the formations of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border, despite the “ceasefire,” are not dwindling, but instead growing in size. The vatnik command is simply pulling up the reserves. [see map].
And the last thing about these two areas. There can be no doubts that the vatnik command DEFINITELY did not choose the southern coastal direction by chance, especially in the general context of the course of war, and the STRATEGIC goals of the vatnik command in it. They are dying to get A CORRIDOR INTO CRIMEA…
4. The western sector. Ukrainian troops continue holding the Krasnohorivka–Marinka–Novomykhailivka line, periodically exchanging fire with vatnik fighters from local groups, who have grown bored with idleness. In this area, any aggressive action from either side has little coherent tactical sense, but the situation can change very quickly in the case of changes on the adjacent southern area of the “front” or in the active Avdiivka area. In both these cases, activation on the flank directions will be vitally important. Whereas for now, local topography and lack of tactical sense do not stimulate either side to active actions with far-reaching goals. Sporadic shelling and attacks of the sides are mainly local, and pursue permanent goals, such as causing fire damage (and resulting losses) to the enemy, improving one’s own position, or harassing action against the enemy.
5. Right now, the most active and the most dangerous is the so-called Avdiivka area, which includes the Donetsk international airport (or rather, what is left of it).
Today, Ukrainian troops continue holding the line Pisky–Airport–Opytne–Avdiivka–Kruta Balka–Vasylivka–Verkhnotoretske–Krasnyi Partyzan. During the past few days, vatnik formations and their supporting terro-Russian units were de facto ramming into the right flank of the Ukrainian group on the Pisky–Avdiivka section, especially near the Airport, trying to push the Ukrainian troops at least beyond the Donetsk ring road, capture the village of Pisky, and take entirely under control the Yasynuvata transport junction and Kruta Balka village.
Vatniks failed to achieve significant success in the above missions. After several “major assaults” (which alternated the direction of the main exertion of force) in the Airport area and on the flanks of this position near Pisky and Avdiivka, the most they accomplished was capturing the ground floor of the main airport terminal for 1 hour, and reaching the ring road in the area north of Spartak. The success of vatnik formations ended at this, as Ukrainian units forced vatniks out of the airport as well as out of two adjacent sites – the hotel and the freight terminal – where they [Ukrainian forces] then secured their position. Avdiivka was not taken either. Near Pisky, the aggressors received a brief but powerful artillery barrage at the initial stage, and reconsidered moving further, limiting themselves to regular raids and shelling of Ukrainian positions in this area.
The characteristic features of combat action in this area were as follows:
• The attacks and assaults were mainly carried out by the most combat-ready local vatnik formations (such as Oplot, Vostok, Sparta, etc.), generously supplemented by terro-Russian “volunteers.” Regular terro-Russian troops either acted in the most important sections or simply “covered” active attacks of the vatnik formations.
• The attackers suffered truly significant losses as a result of their frontal assault – both in combat equipment and in personnel. Sometimes, one could get an impression that vatnik heroes had not been taught even the simplest infantry attack techniques, and their entire idea of an assault is a firm belief that their main goal is to get there first, to fire haphazardly in all directions and run for the terminal building. Naturally, few got to that finish line, and those who did never got to run back. The attempts of vatnik tank operators to fire exclusively from open positions also appear strange. For example, the Ukrainian servicemen defending the airport were once quite bemused to see a dozen terrorist tanks openly driving onto the landing strip to open fire. They made a very attractive target for the defender’s anti-tank weapons.
These, and the number of other examples vividly demonstrate that the assault on the airport was organized and carried out somewhat hectically, to say the least. Or that, in reality, all these attacks on the airport have a different goal than actually capturing the airport…
• The use of artillery in the area by the vatnik formations was conversely marked by a certain commitment and desire to “suppress” the Ukrainian troops at all costs. However, conducting counter-battery [CB] fire still remains a weak spot for the vatnik gunners, especially in the environment where the CB intelligence and fire adjustment is complicated for them.
• A quite active firing mode, by the [band] formations of the vatniks and RaSSeyanskikh [Russian] troops that support them, suggests they do not suffer from a lack of ammunition. And it means, their supply problems are gradually being solved.
The vatnik formations have similarly attempted to “somewhat activate” during the past few days in the area of Chervonyi Partyzan and Verkhnetoretske. However. This resulted in only sporadic shelling…
6. The so-called Debaltseve bridgehead remains another tense point for Ukrainian troops. Continuing to hold the Vuhlehirsk–Illinka–western outskirts of Chornukhyne frontline. Ukrainian troops conducted a number of measures in the past few days to strengthen their positions in this area. This applies primarily to the area south of Debaltseve (Olkhovatka–Nikishyne).
However, apart from the regular fire raids on the positions of Ukrainian troops, not only do the vatniks continue to hold concentrated tactical strike groups at the flanks of the bridgehead, but they also continue to greatly reinforce them. This is especially true about the RaSSeyanska [Russian] armored tank brigade [ATB] in the area of Verhulivka–Sofiivka [Luhansk Oblast], as well as Bezler’s “fosterlings” in the vicinity of Vuhlehirsk, who last week received a significant reinforcement with armor from their chiefs in vato-federation [Russia]. Demonic [Editor: his nickname, Bes, means Demon] offspring even attempt to constantly attack north of the Bulavynske reservoir, but so far without much zeal or success, respectively.
There is no doubt that in the event of the end of the “ceasefire” and the intensification of fighting, these two groups will try to strike when they meet each other, approximately south of Lozove (at the shortest direction) or during the favorable scenario directly in the direction of Svitlodarsk–Luhanske–Myronivskyi. Especially because in this instance, the bezMozgovoy’s [Editor: ironic play on Mozgovoy, which means “out of his mind”] militia that are simply languishing over the impossibility of breaking something and looting in collaboration with the “semi-autonomous” Cossack “states” from Pervomaysk–Alchevsk “district” may, instead of their regular senseless attempts to ram Popasna, nevertheless hit further south, from Irmino towards Troitske and Chervonyi Pakhar. Literally speaking, within the “allied” assistance from the chieftain Kozitsyn to the friendly [band] formations of the military intelligence of “Comrade Bes.”
7. In the past few days, the North–Luhansk area was also characterized by several different “active manifestations” of the truce. For example, a Ukrainian tactical group that was holding the bridge and bridgehead near the village of Shchastya on the Seversky Donets have been repeatedly subjected to massive bombardment from various weapons and even sporadic attacks aimed at taking back the bridge, so far unsuccessfully.
Moreover, the vatniks [continue to] stubbornly hammer the local thermal power plant from mortars, cannon and rocket artillery, intending, as I understand it, to plunge as much of the vatnik population of Luhanda [Luhansk region] into the darkness of the Russian world. That is to say, so that they immediately experience all of its charms and advantages.
In the vicinity of Stanytsia Luhanska, Ukrainian troops unexpectedly found themselves in the role of extras for an unfolding interesting spectacle – the elucidation of who was the more important [gang] was taking place simultaneously among the four (FOUR!) armed groups of locals and newcomers (including from the Caucasus) bandits. They promised to bring popcorn and sodas for Ukrainian troops later (just kidding).
Meanwhile, it looks like Lekha [Oleksiy] bezMozgovoy decided to train for the crossing of the Dnieper by crossing the Seversky Donets near Tryokhizbenka. The idea is not bad, so to say, [the terrorists need] to bypass the Ukry [Ukrainians], who are abutting against Shchastya, with the blow to Raihorodok along the highway T1315. For the second day in a row, the Ukrainian troops have recorded quite a suspicious movement of Cossack formations, reinforced by the Abreks from the Caucasus in the area of Tryokhizbenka–Slovyanoserbsk. Another question is, whether they will be able to succeed or not. Afterall, the Don Cossacks are not as stable as the ideological Russian vatnik “volunteers.” God forbid, they loot and run, as has happened before…
• It seems that no one will wait for winter. The continuation of large–scale hostilities is just around the corner. For, it is cheaper than building a bridge…
• This [situation] creates a very unambiguous impression that the Russian leadership uses the local adherents of the vatnik idea from Dombabwe and Luhanda [play on Donetsk– and Luhansk People’s Republics] “in the dark,” especially in terms of organization and conduct of military operations in Donbas. Local vatniks, driven practically to the limits of madness and frightened by propaganda, get killed first, and in impressive numbers, but they are being replaced rather actively with fresh vatniks from a variety of the local Krasny Shurf, where a TV and a glass of vodka are considered to be the main entertainment…
• Neither one nor the other side will have the time to prepare for combat operations in the autumn-winter period by October 10. This is obvious…
• It is also obvious that the supply of Nedo-rossiya [Editor: not-quite Russia, ironic play on ‘Novo-rossiya’] by the main federation is experiencing a significant distortion. Food, clothing, household items and other non-military supplies to forces constitute 10-15% of the total supply volume of these two bastard formations, when the rest of the [supply] volume is represented by varied shooting and exploding iron [weapons], fuel, and other military bells and whistles. We can make definitive conclusions in this case…
Source: Information Resistance
*video source: RGAKFD. Architect. Number 6148 Kinolitopys “crossing of the Dnieper.” Part 2, b / w, silent. Operators: Kuhn, Sofjin. Production Central Newsreel Studio. 1943
5 min. 15 sec.
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